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SERGEI VINOGRADOV*

Transboundary Water Resources in
the Former Soviet Union: Between
Conflict and Cooperation
ABSTRACT
The demiseof the Soviet Union created new internationalboundariesand,
as a result, a host of legal problems related to the management and utilizationof
natural resources divided by these boundaries. This article surveys the most
importanttransboundarywater systems, shared by the former Soviet republics,and
examines an emerging legalframework for cooperation,multilateral,regionaland
bilateral,between them. Although the currentapproachto the use of transboundary
water resources is still influenced by the practicesestablished in the former Soviet
Union, there is a tendency towards greater reliance upon internationallaw in
addressingwater-relatedissues of common concern.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
newly independent states (NIS) gave rise to a number of political,
economic and legal problems, exceptional in scale and complexity. While
only a few of these countries are truly politically and economically
independent, the relationships between the NIS are governed by
international law, and it is for international lawyers to assess the possible
political and legal repercussions of the latest developments.
The current situation within the territory of the former Soviet
Union (FSU) is unique. With the demise of the USSR, a number of
environmental and natural resource problems, formerly dealt with as
internal concerns on a national level, have acquired international
dimensions. As a consequence, there is an increasing potential for
transfrontier controversies and conflicts.'

* Doctor of Law (Moscow State University); Senior Research Fellow of the Institute
of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences, currently Research Fellow at the Centre for
Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy, University of Dundee. Dr. Vinogradov is a member of
the Water Resources Committee of the International Law Association. The author would like
to thank the Directors of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law (Heidelberg) for the use of the resources of the Institute in the preparation

of this article.
1. See, e.g., S.L. Udall & R.G. Varady, Environmental Conflict and the World's New
InternationalBorders, 7 CIRT TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REPORT 5-6 (1993).
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This observation is particularly relevant with respect to the water
resources shared by the NIS. The problems that these states now confront
are unprecedented in scope, though similar to those found in other parts
of the world. In essence, there are two major issues: 1) the effective
management of transboundary water resources, and 2) the prevention
and resolution of possible international disputes over their utilization.
The purpose of this paper is to address the recent developments
concerning transboundary water resources in the FSU. The first part will
survey the most important transboundary water systems in the NIS. The
second part will provide an overview of the political and environmental
factors that might affect interstate relations in this area. Finally, the paper
will outline an emerging legal framework for cooperation between the
NIS with regard to their shared water resources.
II. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES: GEOGRAPHY
AND POLITICS
There are several major water systems both in the European and
Asian parts of the FSU which are now divided by state boundaries and
thus, must be treated as international.
A. Transboundary Water Systems of the European Partof the Former
Soviet Union
Beginning from the western part of the FSU, there is a system of
rivers and lakes, the largest of which is Lake Choudskoye (Peipus). It
occupies about 3,600 km2 and straddles the border between Russia and
Estonia. Lake Choudskoye connects with the Baltic Sea (Finnish Gulf)
through the Narva River, which forms a part of the Russian-Estonian
border.
The Neman River, 937 km long and draining an area of some
98,000 km2, rises in Byelorussia, flows west and then north through
Lithuania and finally turns west, forming the border between Lithuania
and the Kaliningrad oblast' (region) of Russia. South of Klaipeda, the
Neman River reaches the Kuriches Haff of the Baltic Sea. Part of the river
is navigable.2
The Western Dvina River is 1,020 km long and drains an area of
about 88,000 km2. From its source in Lake Dvinets on Russian territory,
it flows through Russia, Byelorussia, turns northwest through Latvia and
discharges into the Gulf of Riga of the Baltic Sea. The Western Dvina
River has been an important water route since early times and at present

2. See 8 THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 591 (15th ed.) [hereinafter NEB].
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is used for navigation and energy production.3
Further south is the Dnepr (Dnieper) River, the third longest river
in Europe (2,285 km). It rises in the Valdai Hills, about 200 km west of
Moscow. The Dnepr flows south and west, first through Russian (480
km), then through Byelorussian (590 km) and Ukrainian territories. It
finally empties into the Black Sea. The Dnepr's major tributaries-the
Sozh, Pripyat, Desna, Seim, and Vorskla--cross the Russian-Ukrainian,
Russian-Byelorussian or Byelorussian-Ukrainian borders, forming a vast
international drainage basin of 505,000 km2 (more than two times larger
than that of the Rhine). The average annual flow of the river at its mouth
is about 1,670 m3 per second. The Dnepr is a principal water artery of the
southwestern part of the FSU. It is navigable for about 2,000 km. The
river basin, with its 300 hydroelectric plants and a number of canals and
large reservoirs, is a major source of electricity and water supply for the
densely populated industrial regions of Ukraine as well as for irrigation
of the southern Ukraine. Pollution in the river is significant. Chernobyl
is located near the Kiev reservoir, at the confluence of the Pripyat and the
Dnepr.4
The Dnestr (Dniester) River, which is 1,350 km long, rises in the
Carpathian Mountains and flows in a southwestern direction to the Black
Sea. Its basin (72,000 km2) is shared by Ukraine and Moldova. The Dnestr
River is an important water route of Moldova and is used for navigation,
energy production, timber floating and irrigation.'
The Severskiy Donets River, a main tributary of the southern
Russian Don River, is 1,050 km long and drains a basin of 100,000 km2.
It rises in the Central Russian Uplands and flows southeast through
eastern Ukraine before returning to Russian territory and joining the Don.
The river crosses the northern part of the Donets Basin industrial region,
which uses much of its water. Severe pollution, as a consequence of
extensive water utilization by industry and population, affects not only
the Donets itself but also the lower part of the Don River which flows
through Russian territory and enters the Sea of Azov. 6
B.

Transboundary Water Systems of the Caucasus

In the Caucasus there are two main transboundary rivers: the
Kura and Araks. Their basins spread over three Transcaucasian republics:
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kura is 1,515 km long and drains
3. Id. v. 12, at 601.
4. Id. v. 18, at 846-47; id. v. 4, at 141; see also 5 BROCKHAUS ENZYKLOPADIE 570 (1988)
[hereinafter BROCKHAUS].
5. See 4 NEB, supra note 2, at 141.

6. Id. at 174.
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an area of 188,000 km2. It rises in Turkey and flows eastward, crossing
Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Kura and its tributaries have a number of
dams and barrages for hydroelectric and irrigation purposes. Part of the
river is navigable! The Araks (Aras) is about 1,000 km long. It rises in
Turkey and creates the borders between Turkey and Armenia, between
Armenia and Iran and finally, between Iran and Azerbaijan. It joins the
Kura river on the territory of Azerbaijan, 120 km from its mouth on the
Caspian Sea, forming the Kura-Araks Delta. 8
Also worth noting is the Samur River, which rises in the
Caucasus mountains on Russian territory and flows into the Caspian Sea.
Its lower course forms a part of the border between Russia and
Azerbaijan. Having a network of canals, the Samur is used extensively for
irrigation. The major Samur-Apsheron canal brings water to the Apsheron
peninsula in Azerbaijan.
C.

The Caspian Sea Basin

The rivers flowing from the Caucasus, as well as the Volga and
Ural rivers, which flow from the north, belong to the catchment area of
the Caspian Sea which is the world's largest "inland sea".9 It presently
occupies an area of more than 370,000 km2 and stretches over nearly
1,200 km from north to south with an average width of about 320 km.
More than eighty percent of the Caspian Sea shoreline is shared by four
republics of the FSU: Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The rest of its coast belongs to Iran.
The Caspian Sea is unique in many respects. Its subsoil is
exceptionally rich in oil and gas."0 The Sea and its inflowing rivers

7. See 7 NEB, supra note 2, at 39.
8. See I NEB, supra note 2, at 518.
9. The classification of the Caspian is a complicated issue. It is defined as an "inland
sea", for example. See 2 NEB, supra note 2, at 612. The Food and Agriculture Organization's
("FAO") Systematic Index also qualifies the Caspian sea as an "inland sea." See FAO,
Systematic Index of International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases by Basin,
in 2 LEGISLATIVE STUDY No. 34, at 287 (1984). Notably, however, the Caspian Sea is included
in the list of "Major Lakes of the World." WATER INCRISIS 161-65 (P.H. Gleick Ed., 1993)
(Table B.10). One expert from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of
UNESCO has asserted that "from an oceanographic point of view (composition of water,
fauna, flora) the Caspian Sea should be considered as a sea. In fact, the Caspian Sea is a
relict marine basin." See Minutes of the Meeting on Cooperation of UN Organizations in the
Caspian Sea Initiative 5 (Jan, 17, 1995) (on file with the author). For a detailed analysis of the
legal issues regarding the Caspian Sea, see S. Vinogradov & P. Wouters, The Caspian Sea:
Current Legal Problems, 55 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND

V6LKERRECHT 604-23 (1995); S.Vinogradov & P. Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New
Legal Regime, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1996).
10. According to some estimates, the total recoverable resources of the Caspian Sea are
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contain ninety percent of the world's sturgeon and other valuable fishery
resources. However, the Caspian Sea and its basin suffer serious
environmental problems, especially in terms of water quality. Pollution
of the inflowing rivers, particularly of the Volga River which provides
about eighty percent (305 km3) of the total annual inflow, is very high.
Almost all of the waters of Azerbaijan and a large part of Georgia and
Armenia are drained into the Caspian Sea. For example, approximately
seventy-five percent of the waste water produced in Azerbaijan is
discharged into the Caspian without any treatment."
Another problem of great concern to the Caspian littoral states,
particularly those sharing the low gradient northern part of the Sea, is the
recent rise in the sea level. The level of the Caspian Sea, which can
fluctuate much more than the open oceans, depends on many variables,
primarily river inflow and evaporation. The more than two meter
increase (from - 29 to -27 below the global mean sea level) of the Caspian
Sea level in the last fifteen years, coupled with the continuing rise at the
rate of about 15 cm per year, has already resulted in wide-scale
inundation and erosion of coastal areas. Assuming the water level will
continue to rise over the next decades, as is predicted by certain scientific
estimates, more than one hundred thousand people will have to be
removed from the flooded zones. 2
D. Transboundary Water Systems of the Asian Partof the Former
Soviet Union
A number of large river systems, including the Ural and Irtysh,
are shared by Russia and Kazakhstan. The Ural River is 2,428 km long
with a catchment area of 237,000 km2. 3 It rises in the Ural Mountains
on Russian territory and flows south, crosses the northwestern part of
Kazakhstan and flows into the Caspian Sea. Water pollution in the Ural
is considerable because of the high concentration of petrochemical and
metallurgical industries in the basin.14

7,000 MMt of oil and condensate and 5 Tcm of natural gas. See BUSINESS Moscow NEws,
Nov. 9, 1994, at 12, cited in J.P. Dorian & P.S. Kort, Russian Dominance Over "Near Abroad"
Linked to Energy, EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPER, ENERGY & MINERAL SERIES No. 21,
SEPT. 1995, at 13.
11. See EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION PROJECT FOR THE
CASPIAN SEA AND ITS CATCHMENT AREA, SITUATION ANALYSIS AND PROJECT PROPOSAL 5
(1994).
12. Id. at 9.
13. Geographically, the Ural River basin belongs both to the European and Asian parts
of the FSU, as it straddles the imaginary line separating Europe from Asia.
14. See, e.g., 12 NEB, supra note 2, at 194.
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The Irtysh River flows from south to north, forming a part of the
greater basin of the Ob' River, a major river of Western Siberia. The
Irtysh, the largest tributary of the Ob', is 2,640 km long and drains an
area of 1.6 million km. It rises in the Altai Mountains in Sinkiang, China,
crosses the Chinese border, flows west through Lake Zaisan and
northwest across eastern Kazakhstan. The Irtysh traverses Russian
territory and joins the Ob' river at Khanty-Mansiysk. The river is
navigable for most of its course. It has two main tributaries: Ishim and
Tobol. is The Ishim River rises in the north of the Kazakh Uplands and
flows first west then north, crossing the Russian-Kazakh border near
Petropavlovsk. It enters the Irtysh at Ust-Ishim. The river is 2,450 km
long and drains an area of 144,000 km2.' 6 The Tobol River, another left
bank tributary of the Irtysh, is 1,591 km long and has a drainage area of
426,000 km2. It flows northeast across the West Siberian Plain through the
Kustanai oblast' of Kazakhstan and Kurgan and Tyumen oblast's of Russia
before entering the Irtysh."
All transboundary rivers of the Asian part of the FSU are used
extensively. Pollution, especially by heavy metals, and water deficit are
the major problems facing the neighboring regions of Russia and
Kazakhstan. A number of water reservoirs, such as the Karatomar on the
Tobol River, and a system of water conduits, such as the
Irtysh-Karaganda canal which is 490 km long, were constructed to
provide water for industry and population. The water is used primarily
for ore mining and smelting, agriculture, municipal and farm settlements
in northern and eastern Kazakhstan and in the Ural and Western Siberia
regions of Russia."
E. The Aral Sea Basin
Problems of water quantity and quality are even more acute in
Central Asia where environmental crisis has reached unprecedented
proportions. Four Central Asian republics, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan,
Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan, as well as southern Kazakhstan, share
basins of the two principal rivers of the region: the Amu Darya and Syr
Darya. Both rivers flow into the Aral Sea, which straddles the border
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 9

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. v. 6, at 392; 10 BROCKHAUS, supra note 4, at 646.
See 6 NEB, supra note 2, at 406.
Id. v. 11, at 813.
See 6 NEB, supra note 2, at 392; 10 BROCKHAUS, supra note 4, at 646.

19. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE ARAL SEA,
DIAGNOSTIC STUDY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
THE ARAL SEA (1993) [hereinafter THE ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC STUDY].
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Approximately ninety-two percent of the surface water resources
of the region are in the Aral Sea drainage basin. The former Soviet area
of the basin is about 1.5 million km2 and the whole basin comprises about
1.8 million km2 .20 The Amu Darya catchment area constitutes sixty-two
percent of the surface water resources of the region, and the Syr Darya
forms the remaining thirty percent.2 The distribution of water resources
of the Aral Sea drainage basin is exceptionally uneven. Whereas in the
upper reaches of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya there is an abundance
of good-quality water, the middle and lower reaches suffer severe
shortage of potable water resources."
The Amu Darya is 1,415 km long, and has the highest water
bearing capacity of the region. Its average perennial runoff is about 69
km3 and it has a basin area of 465,500 km2. The Amu Darya originates
from the confluence of the Piandj and Vakhsh rivers. The Piandj rises in
the Pamir Mountains and constitutes nearly the entire border between
Tadjikistan and Afghanistan. The Vakhsh is a product of the concourse
of several rivers flowing from Kirghizstan and Tadjikistan. The Amu
Darya flows west, forming the border between Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan, and turns northwest, cutting through the Sundukli and
Karakum deserts of Turkmenistan. Finally, the river crosses the
Karakalpakia region of Uzbekistan and reaches the southern shore of the
Aral Sea. For most of its course, the river flows to its delta without
receiving any water and loses much of it to irrigation, evaporation and
drainage.'
The Syr Darya is the longest river in Central Asia (2,212 km) but
it carries less water than the Amu Darya. Its basin includes the rivers of
the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan and the Naryn and Kara Darya rivers,
which flow from Kirghizstan. After the confluence of the Naryn and Kara
Darya, the Syr Darya flows west, crossing Tadjikistan and Uzbek
territory, and then turns northwest through Kazakhstan to the Aral
Sea.24
Both the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins have an extended
network of dams, reservoirs and irrigation canals. The largest canal is the
Karakum Canal in Turkmenistan, which is 1,100 km long, from 20 to 100

20. The Aral drainage basin includes also parts of northern Afghanistan and
northeastern Iran. THE ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC STUDY, supra note 19, at 3.
21. P.R. Craumer, Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out-Migration in Soviet
Central Asia, in R.A.LEWiS, GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 35 (1992).
22. THE ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC STUDY, supra note 19, at 18.
23. See I NEB, supra note 2, at 358; see also THE ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC STUDY, supra note
19, at 20-21.
24. See 11 NEB, supra note 2, at 468; see also THE ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC STUDY, supra
note 19, at 21-26.
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meters wide and navigable over 550 km. Its construction began in 1954 and
its last leg is almost complete. The purpose of the canal was to transfer
water to the southwestern part of Turkmenistan. The total2amount of water
3
diverted by this canal is estimated at 15-20 km per year. 5
The Aral Sea basin countries face a host of problems, including
the significant degradation of environmental quality, serious deterioration
of the health of the basin population, reduction in the efficiency of the
regional economy and significant desiccation of the Sea itself. Once the
fourth largest lake in the world, the Aral Sea has shrunk dramatically
over the last thirty years.' The major reason for this was the increased
removal of water from its inflowing rivers for irrigation. The annual
water inflow into the Sea was reduced from approximately 69 km 3 in the
1960's to just 5 km 3 in 1989-90. The input of the Amu Darya to the Sea
has been reduced to about 5 km3, and the flow of the Syr Darya has more
or less ceased since 1978.27
The Aral Sea, although much smaller and more saline than in the
past, remains a significant water resource of the entire region. It has
considerable potential for commercial, recreational, tourist and other uses.
It also plays an important role in determining the climatic conditions in
the region. In order to stabilize the Sea at its present level, there is a need
to significantly increase the water inflow, according to some estimates to
not less than 22-30 km3 per year."
F. Relevant Factors:An Overview
All shared water systems in the FSU vary significantly with
respect to their natural and climatic, conditions, degree and scope of

25. See M. H. Glantz, Creeping Environmental Phenomena in the Aral Sea Basin, Paper

Presented at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's International Workshop, Critical
Scientific Issues of the Aral Sea Basin: State of Knowledge and Future Research Needs 20
(May 2-5, 1994); A. Giroux, Les Etats d'Asie Centrale Face 4 l'Independance Ouzbekistan,
R0publique Kirghize, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, LE COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST, Apr. 1994, at
6.
26. Since 1960, the area of the Aral Sea has decreased by fifty percent from 66,900 to
around 33,000 km2 and its volume fell by seventy-four percent from 1090 to 280 km3.
Salinity has risen from ten to around thirty grams per liter. See The ARAL SEA, DIAGNOSTIC
STUDY, supra note 19, at 53-57; see also P. Micklin, The Aral Crisis:Introduction to the Special
Issue, 33 POST-SOvIET GEOGRAPHY 275 (1992)
27. P. Sinnot, The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem, in
R.A. LEWIS, GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 87 (1992).
28. "Basic Provisions of the Concept concerning Solution of the Problems of the Aral
Sea, its Coastal Area and the Aral Sea Basin with Respect to Social and Economic
Development of the Region," adopted by the Decision of the Heads of Central Asian states
and the Government of Russian Federation (the latter as observer), Jan. 11, 1994, in Nukus,
at 10 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Basic Provisions].
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development, extent of water use and pollution. In the European part of
the FSU, there are generally sufficient water resources, and the main
concern there is water pollution. In the southern and eastern parts of the
FSU, especially in Central Asia, water availability and quality are major
problems.
In the NIS, environmental protection appears to be an area
where political considerations do not overshadow the need for concerted
actions. Here, as compared with military or economic fields, some kind
of common approach is relatively easier to achieve. Elimination of the
centralized and relatively effective system of water management and
pollution control that existed in the FSU has created an objective need for
the NIS to coordinate their environmental and water management
policies.
However, certain political factors could either obstruct or facilitate
cooperation in the management and utilization of shared water resources.
First, the emergence of the NIS resulted in the transformation of rather
symbolic borders between the former Soviet republics into international
boundaries. The legitimacy of these boundaries is yet to be confirmed.
Explicit or implicit territorial claims such as that of Estonia against Russia
with respect to some boundary areas do not encourage cooperation in
managing their transfrontier waters.
Moreover, political relations between the NIS differ significantly
depending upon the states concerned. These relations vary from relative
integration, as between Russia and Byelorussia, to aloofness, as between
Russia and the Baltic states, even to open hostility, as between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Some states are overwhelmed by civil wars and turmoil,
such as Tadjikistan and Georgia, or internally divided, such as Moldova,
where the Trans-Dnestr republic, separated by the Dnestr river from the
rest of the country, claims independence. Internal and external political
instability and conflicts inevitably affect these states' willingness or ability
to cooperate.
The majority of the former Soviet republics participate in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, the CIS, a rather
loose organization, is not able to impose obligatory decisions or ensure
unified policy, especially in sensitive areas. At present, it is hard to
expect that all of the former Soviet republics will be equally eager to deal
with each other on such issues as environmental protection and natural
resource management. However, at least some of the NIS have come to
realize that cooperation between them is essential in solving both
domestic and transfrontier environmental problems.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

III.

A.

[Vol. 36

AN EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COOPERATION2

MultilateralCooperationwithin the CIS

Of the numerous documents concluded by the NIS, primarily
within the CIS, none directly deals with the issue of transboundary water
resources. However, some of these documents either refer to the
environment in general or contain provisions which can be regarded as
relevant to the topic of transboundary water resources.'
The CIS Charter of 1993 (the Charter) serves as a foundation for

cooperation between the CIS members in different areas, including
protection of the environment. 3' Article 2 of the Charter enumerates,
among other basic purposes of the Commonwealth, comprehensive
cooperation in the field of the environment.32 According to Article 4,
protection of the human health and the environment belongs to the
sphere of joint activities of its members.' The Charter includes, among

other areas of cooperation, "joint measures for protection of the
environment" and "mutual assistance in elimination of the consequences
of ecological disasters and of other kinds of emergency situations".' The

Charter, however, does not go beyond these very general provisions,
which is quite understandable given the circumstances of its drafting and
the predominately political factors that motivated its adoption.
More specific provisions are contained in the Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Ecology and Environmental Protection of
February 8, 1992 (the Agreement) which was signed by ten of the fifteen
former Soviet republics.35 In fact, this was one of the first agreements

29. This study focuses on the water-related legal developments between the NIS only.
It does not address relations between the NIS and the states-neighbors of the FSU (such as
Finland, Poland, China, etc.), nor does it consider multilateral international regimes relevant
to the topic, such as the 1974 and 1992 Conventions on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area and the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black
Sea against Pollution. Both regimes prescribe measures relating to land-based pollution,
including pollution through inflowing rivers.
30. For a more detailed summary of the environment-related cooperation within the
CIS, see S. Vinogradov & A. Tranin, CIS: INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [STATE AND LAW], No 12, 1994, at
37-45 (in Russian).
31. Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, June 22, 1993, 34 I.L.M. 1279
(1995) [hereinafter Charter of the Commnonwealthj,
32. Id. at 1283.
33. Id. at 1284.
34. Charter of the Commonwealth, art. 19, supra note 31, at 1288.
35. See Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Ecology and Protection of the Natural
Environment, Feb. 8, 1992, in 1 BYULLETEN' MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV [BULLETIN OF
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concluded by the NIS. The Agreement lays down some fundamental
principles, such as: the right of every human being to a decent
environment and ecological security, the right of every state to pursue its
own policy in the exploitation of its natural resources, the non-harmful
use of the territory of one state with respect to the environment and
natural resources of the others, and the recognition of the integrity and
indivisibility of the natural environment.' The parties to the Agreement
acknowledge in its preamble that ecosystems and river basins do not
coincide with interstate boundaries. However, having a "framework"
character, the instrument does not contain any specific rules regarding the
management or exploitation of shared natural resources.
Thus, the states parties to the Agreement undertake to work
jointly in elaborating and implementing their environmental policies.'
Such joint efforts are to include:
harmonization of their environmental
legislation, norms and standards;
joint development and fulfillment of interstate
environmental programs and projects;
use of common criteria, methods and
procedures of environmental assessment and
control;
establishment and support of the interstate
environmental information system;
elaboration and implementation of common
economic incentives and sanctions; and
cooperation and mutual assistance in cases of
environmental emergencies.'
In order to achieve these goals, the parties decided to create an
institutional infrastructure consisting of the Interstate Ecological Council
(IEC) and Interstate Ecological Fund (IER. The IEF is designed to
provide financial support for joint environmental programs and, in
particular, remedial measures in the event of environmental
emergency.' The IEC has a mandate to fulfill such functions as:

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS] 8-12 (1993) (in Russian). The Agreement was signed by the

following NIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Id.
36. Id. at preamble.
37. Id. at art. 1.
38. Id. at art. 2.
39. Id. at art. 4.
40. Id. at art. 4.
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coordination and implementation of agreed
upon environmental policies;
environmental assessment of development
and investment programs and projects, which
affect or can affect the interests of two or
more state parties;
assistance in the resolution of environmental
conflicts between the parties; and
definition of conditions and terms of the
parties' implementation of obligations under
international environmental agreements of the
former Soviet Union.4'
It was decided that the Agreement would be supplemented by
additional agreements or protocols on specific issues of multilateral
cooperation.42 In the following years, a number of such documents were
agreed to, thus broadening the normative basis of environmental
cooperation.
The Protocol on the Establishment and Powers of the Inter-State
Ecological Council was adopted at the first session of the IEC in June
1992 (the Protocol).43 It defines the composition, functions and powers
of the IEC as an international coordinating body and its structure and
procedures. The IEC is composed of the environmental ministers of the
states parties and its decisions, adopted by consensus, are binding on the
4
members." It convenes on a regular basis.
The Protocol sets forth the basic provisions of the IEF that
functions under the auspices of the IEC. More detailed provisions
concerning the IEF are contained in the Statute of the IEF adopted at the
same session.* The headquarters of both institutions are located in
Minsk (Byelorussia).
The supplemental Protocol on Obligations, Rights and
Responsibility of the Parties to the Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (the supplemental Protocol) was adopted at the third session
of the IEC in 1993. 4' Under the supplemental Protocol, the parties agreed

41. Id. at art. 5.

42. Id.at arts. 5, 6.
43. Minutes of the First Session, Interstate Ecological Council at 9-10 (1992)(in Russian)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter IEC Minutes I.
44. Id.
45. The following sessions of the IEC have been convened to date: July 1, 1992, Minsk
(Byelorussia); Oct. 2,1992, Almaty (Kazakhstan); 3rd-May 1993, Tashkent (Uzbekistan); Nov.
4, 1993, Minsk; 5th-September 1994, Moscow (Russia); June 6, 1995, Minsk.
46. IEC Minutes I, supra note 43.
47. Minutes of the Third Session, Interstate Ecological Council, Supp. 14, at 27-28 (1993)
(in Russian) (on file with the author).
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to, inter alia, ensure implementation of the decisions of the IEC; receive
observers of the IEC or of interested states parties within their respective
territories for appraisal of environmental situations of interstate concern;
exchange information on the state of their respective environments;
resolve their controversies and disputes through consultations between
them or special sessions of the IEC; provide each other with information
on environmental impact assessment of the projects which might cause
transfrontier pollution; and, coordinate environmental protection
measures in the territories adjacent to their borders.' Failure to fulfill
these obligations may lead to sanctions as defined by the IEC.49 The
parties are entitled to, inter alia, receive information at the disposal of the
IEC; have access to technologies and methods developed under the
auspices of the IEC, and exchange observers for the assessment of
environmental situation and transfrontier impact of activities undertaken
on another state's territory.s°
The supplemental Protocol has serious deficiencies. There is a
notable absence of legal expertise in its drafting. 1 The provisions of the
supplemental Protocol are vague and imprecise. The document lacks the
necessary procedural prerequisites to facilitate the implementation. For
instance, it provides that the parties bear responsibility for the fulfillment
of their obligations under the Agreement. Parties are also responsible for
reliability of the information provided by them to the IEC. However,
there is no indication as to what kind of sanctions will be imposed
against parties failing to fulfill their obligations or how relevant decisions
can be made by the IEC, which must act on the basis of consensus. On
the whole, the supplemental Protocol is more a declaration of intentions
rather than a serious legal document. It is unlikely that the Protocol will
serve as a viable instrument in the event of serious environmental
controversy between the parties.
The practical achievements of the IEC in promoting
environmental cooperation are not very impressive. Financial constraints
play a particularly negative role in this respect. In addition, political
interests and considerations still prevail over environmental concerns in
the relationships between some of the NIS. Thus, the number of states
that demonstrate genuine interest in environmental cooperation on a

48. Id. at art. 1.
49. Id. at art. 3.
50. Id. at art. 2.
51. The Protocol was drafted by Moldova and initialed at the second session of the IEC.
However, due to significant substantive and redactional defects of the text, it had to be
redrafted, although the final version of the Protocol retained its major shortcomings.
Interestingly, Moldova did not sign the Protocol, nor did it participate in the sessions of the
IEC.
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multilateral level has decreased since February 1992. Only seven out of
the initial ten signatories of the Agreement took part in the subsequent
sessions of the IEC. 2
At its first session, the IEC considered the most critical
environmental issues and defined a list of priority areas for future
ecological cooperation. These included, inter alia, protection and rational
use of the water resources of the Dnepr river basin, the Caspian Sea, the
Aral Sea basin and the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers and protection
of the Black, Azov and Baltic Seas.' However, too little has been done
in this respect within the framework of the IEC, an organization not
particularly suited to deal with the issues of shared natural resource
utilization and management. Instead, there is a marked trend towards a
more limited, subregional or bilateral approach with regard to
transboundary water resources. This is so in the case of the Caspian Sea,
which is now the subject of negotiations between coastal states,' the
Aral Sea basin and of the water resources shared by Russia with Ukraine
and Kazakhstan.
B. -SubregionalCooperation: the Aral Sea Basin
The environmental crisis in the Aral Sea basin, including the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya rivers, has recently become the focus of growing
interstate cooperation between the five Central Asian republics. Having
inherited the Soviet-era system and principles of water distribution in the
region, the basin states have been able to collaborate over issues of common
pressing concern. In fact, the water management practices and
infrastructure that existed prior to independence have facilitated
cooperative efforts of the Aral states and helped to avoid serious disputes
regarding the exploitation of transboundary water resources.
Having obtained the new status of independent states, the Central
Asian republics immediately focused on the most acute problem of their
interstate relations - management and utilization of scarce water resources
of the region. As a first step in coordinating their national water policies
they concluded, on February 18, 1992, an agreement concerning
transboundary water resources.m The Agreement provides for the
52. Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan abstained from signing the supplementary
protocols and from participation in the IEC. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova
took part in the work of the fifth session of the IEC.
53. See IEC Minutes I, supra note 43.
54. See Sergei Vinogradov & Patricia Wouters, The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New Legal
Regime, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (1996).
55. Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and Protection of
Interstate Water Resources, Feb. 18, 1992, Kazakhstan-Kirghizstan-TadjikistanTurkmenistan-Uzbekistan (in Russian) (on file with the author).
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equality of the parties' rights to use, and responsibility to ensure rational
utilization and protection, of the water resources of the region which are
defined as "common and integral".' The parties undertake to strictly
57
observe the agreed regime and regulations of water use and protection,
and to refrain from activities within their respective territories that might
affect the interests of other parties or cause damage to them, lead to
deviation from the agreed volumes of water consumption or to pollution
of water.' Other obligations include coordination of efforts to solve the
Aral Sea crisis,' exchange of information in the field of water
management, comprehensive utilization and protection of the water
resources, and joint scientific research.'
The Agreement establishes the Interstate Commission for Water
Management Coordination (ICWC) with a mandate to control and ensure
rational utilization and protection of the interstate water resources.61 The
ICWC is responsible, inter alia, for the determination of the water
management policy in the region; comprehensive and rational utilization
of the water resources; annual preparation and approval of the water
consumption limits for each of the republics and for the region as a
whole.' The decisions of the ICWC regarding the specified intake limits,
rational utilization and protection of the water resources are obligatory
for all water users.' The parties agree to elaborate economic and other
forms of responsibility for violation of the specified regime and limits of
water utilization." Any disputes under the Agreement are to be settled
by the heads of the parties' water management authorities, and, if
necessary, with the participation of a party not involved in the dispute.'
The ICWC is designated also to govern activities of the two
inter-republican Basin Water Management Bodies (Bassejnovoe Vodnoje
Ob'edinenie-BVO): BVO "Amu Darya" and BVO "Syr Darya".' By this
decision, the five Central Asian states have preserved the unified water
management system in the form of BVOs, created in 1986.67 Initially
subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Water Management (Minvodkhoz),
the BVOs, following independence, were subordinated to the ICWC as a

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

art. 1.
art. 2.
art. 3.
art. 4.
art. 5.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Basic

art. 6.
art. 7.
art. 10.
art. 11.
art. 12.
art. 8.
Provisions, supra note 28, at 10.
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single organ responsible for water management in the region.'
Subsequently, the BVOs' functions were significantly broadened. In the
past these functions related primarily to water use control and
implementation of water allocation decisions taken by the Minvodkhoz.
Since 1992, however, the ICWC and its bodies are responsible also for
water development and allocation planning, both short-term and
long-term, water quality control and water conservation and
environmental protection.' The ICWC has been involved in preparing
annual plans for water allocation and utilization at the interstate level;
defining limits of water use by each riparian state; determining common
technical solutions regarding the water resources in the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya basins, including their tributaries, and the irrigation and
drainage water collector network.7'
The subregional cooperation was significantly fostered by the
Agreement concerning joint actions for addressing the Aral Sea crisis,
which was signed by the Heads of Central Asian states on March 26,
1993. 7' The objectives of the parties, as defined in the Agreement,
include, inter alia, the rational utilization of the limited land and water
resources of the Aral Sea basin; maintaining appropriate water quality in
the rivers, reservoirs and aquifers through reduction and prevention of
the discharge of polluted or untreated waste or drainage waters; ensuring
water inflow to the Aral Sea (which would maintain it at an ecologically
acceptable level), thus preserving the Sea as an object of nature;
improving the system of water utilization in the basin and creating
interstate legal and regulatory instruments; and, resumption of works, on
new mutually acceptable terms, aimed at the transfer of additional water
resources to the Aral Sea basin.'
The Agreement established the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea
(ICAS).73 The ICAS is comprised of the Executive Committee (EC), the
ICWC, which was included in the ICAS as one of its main organs, and
the Interstate Commission on Socio-Economic Development, Scientific,

68. See supra note 55, at art. 8. See also Statute (Regulations) of the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination, Tashkent, December 5, 1992 (on file with the author).
69. Information on the current activities of the ICWC and BVOs was provided to the
author at a NATO International Workshop in Tashkent, Critical Scientific Issues of the Aral
Sea Basin: State of Knowledge and Future Research Needs (May 2-5, 1994).
70. Id.
71. Agreement on Joint Actions for Addressing the Problems of the Aral Sea and its
Coastal Area, Improving of the Environment and Ensuring the Social and Economic
Development of the Aral Sea Region, March 26, 1993, Kazakhstan-Kirghizstan-TadjikistanTurkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Russia (with Russia as observer) (in Russian) (on file with the
author).
72. Id. at art. 1.
73. Id. at art. 2.
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Technical and Ecological Cooperation. 4 The ICAS was designated as the
principal regional organization responsible for formulating policies and
preparing and implementing programs for addressing the crisis! 5 The
ICAS consists of twenty high-level members, including ministers of water
management from each state.76 Each state has one vote and the ICAS's
decisions are adopted by consensus.7 Representatives of the Russian
Federation participate in the work of the ICAS as observers. The ICAS
meets at least twice a year.
The ICAS is entrusted with policy-making functions. It can adopt
recommendations concerning social, economic and environmental
problems of common interest; approve joint programs and plans of
actions; recommend interstate legal instruments and common principles
of water management, utilization and protection, for adoption by its
member states; and approve financial arrangements necessary for the
implementation of respective programs and projects.'
The EC is a permanent operational organ of the ICAS. It is
charged, among other tasks, with projects selection, preparation and
implementation, realization of the decisions of the ICAS and cooperation
with other international institutions.'
Another major regional institution is the International Fund for
the Aral Sea (IFAS) which was created in January 1993. It is
responsible for mobilizing the financial resources provided by its member
states and donors, other states and international agencies. The IFAS,
using these funds, is to implement the projects approved by the ICAS.
The state parties to the Agreement undertook also to work out a
joint strategy addressing the Aral Sea crisis and to prepare a coordinated
program of actions. The Basic Provisions of the Concept (the Concept)
and a short-term Program were adopted at a meeting of the Heads of
Central Asian states in January 1994 in Nukus (Uzbekistan)."'
74. Id.
75. The Statutes (Regulations) of the ICAS and its Executive Council were adopted on
July 13, 1993 and subsequently approved by the Heads of State on January 11, 1994 at the
meeting in Nukus (on file with the author).
76. Statutes of the ICAS, supra note 75, at para. 1.
77. Id. at para. 8.
78. Id. at para. 5.
79. See Statute of the ICAS Executive Council, supra note 75.
80. The decision to create the IFAS was taken by the Heads of the Aral basin states on
January 4, 1993. The Statute (Regulations) of the Fund was adopted at a meeting in
Kzyl-Orda on February 26, 1993 (on file with the author).
81. Basic Provisions, supra note 28, and the "Program of actions aimed at improving the
environmental situation in the Aral Sea basin over the next 3-5 years with respect to social
and economic development of the region" [hereinafter Programof Actions] were adopted by
the Decision of the Heads of Central Asian states and the Government of Russian Federation
(the latter as observer), January 11, 1994, in Nukus (on file with the author).
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The Concept formulates a new strategy for the economic
development of the Aral Sea basin given the limited water resources in
the region. The strategy is based principally upon a policy of water
conservation that is to be implemented at all levels, and in all spheres, of
the regional economy, primarily in agriculture and industry. It is
envisaged that these measures will increase the river inflow to the Aral
Sea up to 22 km 3 annually by the year 2000, and up to 30 km3 after
2010.' Importantly, the Aral Sea was finally recognized as a legitimate
water user along with the five basin states.
The Program focuses on a number of concrete projects to be
realized over the next three to five years. The Aral Sea basin states
intend, inter alia, to work out a common strategy of allocation, rational
utilization and protection of water resources in the Aral Sea basin and to
draft interstate legal instruments for implementing this strategy; to
develop a unified inventory system of the Aral Sea basin water resources;
to take measures of water pollution prevention and control, particularly
with respect to drainage waters and industrial wastes; to complete the
drainage water collector systems in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins
and to construct a number of waste water treatment plants in the region;
to prepare projects aimed at creating artificially watered ecosystems in
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya deltas and on the exposed Aral Sea
bed. 3
A very sensitive issue, raised in both the Concept and Program,
is the idea to supplement diminished water resources of the region by a
water transfer into the Aral Sea basin from extra-basin sources.' These
kinds of projects, involving primarily Russia's Siberian rivers, for
example, the Ob' River, were conceived long before the demise of the
Soviet Union.' At that time, it was a purely domestic matter, requiring
simply a decision by a central authority. Presently, however, the issue of
an extra-basin water transfer has acquired an international character. Any
such project will require a very thorough examination of its political,
economic and ecological consequences, both at the domestic and
international levels, and the subsequent elaboration of an international
agreement. In view of the increased environmental awareness in Russia,
it is doubtful that any project of this kind will be readily accepted by the
Russian public and approved by the Russian Parliament.
The quality of the legal documents concluded to date in the

82. See Basic Provisions, supra note 28, at 10.
83. Id.
84. See Basic Provisions, supra note 28, at 10; Program of Actions, supranote 28, at para.
8.
85. Some Central Asian politicians assume that Russia still owes them Siberian river
water, regarding the Aral Sea crisis as a legacy of the FSU.
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context of the Aral Sea basin leaves much to be desired. This can be
explained, in part, by a general lack of international legal expertise in the
countries concerned. Assessing the legal instruments concluded in the
region, one leading authority in the field noted that they have been
drawn up in the absence of a thorough study of the situation and are
replete with duplications and inconsistencies." His more serious
criticism is that "the agreements seem to imply acceptance of the existing
situation with regard to the use of water, which calls for water
apportionment and maximum utilization.". 87 According to prevailing
international practice, the concept of water apportionment is replaced
with that of equitable and reasonable utilization. In addition, the
emphasis currently is on the optimum, rather than maximum,
utilization.' Finally, the Aral Sea documents lack provisions regarding
compensation for damage and dispute settlement.
As to the new regional institutions, their functions and
responsibilities are either not clearly defined or overlap, thus creating the
potential for jurisdictional disputes. Some critics also highlight the
confusion between regulatory and development functions, particularly in
the case of ICAS and ICWC. 9
At present, there exists a host of legal problems relating to
interstate water rights, water and land use management, pollution
prevention and control measures, environment and wetlands
management standards and other matters which have to be dealt with by
states and new regional institutions. International instruments and
regulations will be required to set forth rules and standards, as well as
national laws and mechanisms to implement them. There is also a need
to improve the institutional framework in the basin. The proposals range
from a radical change in the existing framework that would turn the
ICAS into a strong regulatory basin institution to a more moderate
modification involving the streamlining of existing bodies and the
elimination of functional duplication.'
All this calls for a significant improvement of the legal
component of the Aral Sea basin cooperation. This task could be
facilitated through the assistance of international organizations and
development and financial agencies, such as the European Union, the
World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP, all of which are currently involved in

86. D. Caponera, Legal and InstitutionalFrameworkfor the Management of the Arat Sea Basin
Water Resources, in REPORT FOR THE EU- TACIS PROGRAMME, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS 26 (1995).

87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 27-29.
90. Id. at 30-33.
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numerous activities addressing the Aral Sea crisis."
C. Bilateral Cooperation
A number of transboundary drainage basins in the FSU are
shared by only two states and are the subject of bilateral relations. This
is particularly the case with the three largest former Soviet republics:
Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Russia, having a common land and
maritime border with sixteen other countries, is destined to deal with
many transboundary problems on a bilateral level. In 1992, Russia
initiated agreements on the joint utilization and protection of
transboundary water resources with its neighboring former Soviet
republics-Kazakhstan and Ukraine.92
These documents are similar in many respects. A duty to
cooperate in the management of transboundary water objects93 is the
underlying principle of both agreements. This is reflected in the
obligations of the parties: to adopt joint measures on water regulation
and protection; to exchange information regarding shared water
resources; 95 to notify in emergency situations;9 to apportion water
91. The European Union is currently implementing a project aimed at improving the
administrative, institutional and technical framework within which the Aral Sea basin states
can develop policies, strategies and development programs for utilization, allocation and
management of the water resources of the basin. See European Union Technical Assistance
to the Economic Reform in the New Independent States Water Resource Management and
Agricultural Production in the Central Asian Republics (1994). The World Bank, UNEP, and
UNDP provide technical and financial support to the plan of actions addressing the Aral
Sea crisis of the five Central Asian states. See, e.g., World Bank Preparation Mission, Aral
Sea Program-Phase 1, Aide-Memoire (Feb. 22-Mar. 19, 1994). Assistance in legal and
institutional fields is a major component of both programs.
92. Agreement on the Joint Utilization and Protection of Transboundary Water Objects,
Aug. 27,1992, Russian Fed.-Kazakhstan [hereinafter Russian-Kazakh Agreement] (on file with
the author); Agreement on the Joint Utilization and Protection of Transboundary Water
Objects, Oct. 19, 1992, Russian Fed,-Ukraine [hereinafter Russian-Ukrainian Agreement] (on
file with the author).
93. The agreements contain different definitions of transboundary water objects. Under
the Russian-Kazakh agreement they mean "any surface water objects or underground
waters, which form, cross the interstate borders or straddle them." Russian-Kazakh
Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 1. The Russian-Ukrainian agreement contains a rather
confusing definition of the same term, described as "the parts of rivers and of other surface
watercourses, which form the interstate border; the surface and underground waters in the
points, crossed by the interstate border," Russian-Uknarainian Agreement, supra note 92, at
art. 1).
94. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 4.; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 3.
95. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 8; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 6.
96. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 10; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
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resources through agreed comprehensive schemes of water allocation;9
and, to cooperate in monitoring of water quantity and quality." Any
water-related project or activity that might have transboundary
consequences requires the prior consent of the other party."
The parties also agree to adopt and implement pollution
prevention measures and to refrain from activities that may cause adverse
transboundary impact."® In the case of damages or losses inflicted upon
one riparian state or within its territory by the water-related activities of
another, the latter state is obliged to compensate for such damages. The
amount of compensation is to be determined by a joint group of
experts.'0 '
Both agreements establish institutional mechanisms for
cooperation. The Russian-Kazakh agreement sets forth a permanent
body-the Commission on the Joint Utilization and Protection of
Transboundary Water Objects-with a mandate to coordinate the
activities of the parties, exchange hydrological data and other relevant
information, control the implementation of agreed measures, and solve
disputes between the parties.0 2 Under the Russian-Ukrainian
agreement, similar functions are entrusted to the Meetings of
Plenipotentiaries convened at least once a year."°
However, the agreements are not identical. They contain some
distinct provisions, which reflect the different natural conditions and
water-related problems in the respective drainage basins. Thus, the
emphasis in the Russian-Kazakh agreement is on the allocation of water
resources. The document stresses the community of water resources of
transboundary water objects, and the equality of rights and
responsibilities of the parties with respect to their utilization and
protection.1°4 Interestingly, the Russian-Kazakh Agreement confirms the
water allocation principles and schemes established in the times of the

supra note 92, at art. 6.
97. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 5; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 4.
98. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 9; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 6.
99. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 5; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 2.
100. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 3. Surprisingly, the
Russian-Ukrainian agreement does not contain a general obligation to take pollution
prevention measures, except in emergency situations. Russian-Ukrainian Agreement, supra
note 92, at art. 6.
101. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at art. 7; Russian-Ukrainian agreement,
supra note 92, at art. 5.
102. Russian-Kazakh Agreement, supra note 92, at arts. 11-13.
103. Russian-Ukrainian agreement, supra note 92, at arts. 13-16.
104. Russian-Kazakh agreement, supra note 92, at art. 2.
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FSU.0 5 The Russian-Ukrainian agreement, on the other hand, is more
concerned with such issues as the regulation of water flow, flood control
and the conservation and optimal utilization of the biological resources
in transboundary waters."
Given the very short time that has elapsed since the adoption of
both agreements, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of each. It is
evident, however, that a crucial factor in this respect will be the nature
of future political and economic relations between the states concerned.
CONCLUSION
At present, principles and norms of international water law play
a subordinate role in the relations between the NIS regarding
transboundary water resources. In many respects, the current interstate
policies are still determined by the decisions and practices established in
the FSU before independence. The legal instruments adopted to date (for
example, in the case of the Aral Sea basin) are often inadequate to deal
with the complexity of water-related problems. There is an obvious
tendency, however, towards more reliance upon relevant international
law in addressing common issues of transboundary water resources.
Two opposing factors might determine ultimately whether, and
how successfully, the problems of transboundary water resources in the
FSU will be resolved. On the one hand, it is the existing political tension
between some of the former Soviet republics in the absence of the
mitigating role of a central authority. On the other hand, it is the
continued economic and political interdependence of the NIS, together
with their evident community of interests in many areas, including the
use of transboundary water resources.

105. Russian-Kazakh agreement, supra note 92, at art. 4.
106. Russian-Ukrainian agreement, supra note 92, at arts. 7, 11, 12.
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